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Where Does the Dirham Stop in a Sukuk
Default?
By IRINA MARINESCU*
I. Introduction
There were at least eighty-eight global protests during the week
of February 14, 2011.1 The most prominent were in the Arab world
(e.g., Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Morocco, Libya).2 Some argue these
protests are owed at least in part to global economic uncertainty and
instability, even going so far as to blame Ben Bernanke.3 Still others
suggest Islam has been a deterrent to economic growth in the Arab
world.4 Although the latter claims are broad and thus hard to
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The author is eternally grateful to Ian Sterling for the exposure, Professor Bill
Dodge for the inspiration, parents for their support, and a storied list of readers too
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Dina Mohamed Samir El Naggar. Thank you friends, mentors, and knowledgeable
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1. World On Fire - Mapping Last Week's 88 Global Protests, ZERO HEDGE (Feb. 18,
2011), http://www.zerohedge.com/article/world-fire-mapping-last-weeks-88-
global-protests. See also The Path of Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2012), http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-
interactive-timeline.
2. Political Unrest in North Africa and the Middle East, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/21/world/middleeast/update-
mideast-countries.html?ref-middleeast.
3. Is Bernanke To Blame For The Rising Global Revolutionary Wave?, ZERO HEDGE
(Feb. 19, 2011), http://www.zerohedge.com/article/bernanke-blame-rising-global-
revolutionary-wave.
4. See John Cassidy, Annals of Economics: Prophet Motive, THE NEW YORKER (Feb.
28, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/02/28/110228fa fact
cassidy (introducing arguments by Harvard's David Landes, Princeton's Bernard
Lewis, Max Weber, and Timur Kuran to the effect that religion generally plays a
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substantiate empirically, is the underlying conceptual connection
between economic and sociopolitical instability far-fetched?5 This is
not to say that economic uncertainty is alone to blame. Underlying
economic uncertainty are the rules (read: laws) governing the Arab
world and the West. This Note focuses on the rules governing
Islamic finance. More specifically, this Note posits that one
complicating factor to growth in the sukuk space is the lack of legal
clarity around default mechanisms.6
Even if the conceptual connection between economic and
sociopolitical instability on the one hand, and legal clarity in finance
on the other - seems tenuous or simplistic, 7 there are other
central role in economic development (Weber), and that Islam specifically long-
eschewed the scientific and intellectual activity underlying economic development
(Landes and others)).
5. Recall the Great Depression. See LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE
BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD (2009) (account of the Great Depression as told
through the interactions among the four most powerful players at the time:
Benjamin Strong of the Federal Reserve of New York, Montagu Norman of the
Bank of England, Emile Morceau of the Banque de France, and Hjalmer Schacht of
the Reichsbank of Germany. The liquidity crisis of 1914 bears relevance to the 2008
credit crunch and ensuing global debacle.). Also consider Bahrain's sovereign
sukuk issue, which has attracted widespread international attention from both
Islamic and conventional bankers. See Rodney Wilson, Overview of the Sukuk
Market, in ISLAMIC BONDS: YOUR GUIDE TO ISSUING, STRUCTURING AND INVESTING IN
SUKUK 4 (Euromoney Institutional Investor PLC 2004). Bahrain was during the
Arab Spring considered by some to be the epicenter of current sociopolitical
instability. See Taking Back Bahrain's 'Tahrir', AL JAZEERA (Feb. 19, 2011),
http://english. aljazeera.net/indepth/2011/02/2011219201753524228.html.
6. Specifically, this Note focuses on sukuk-specific considerations. Sukuk are
participatory certificates frequently conceived of as Islamic bonds. See Dr. Asyraf
Wajdi Dusuki & Shabnam Mokhtar, Critical Appraisal of Shari'ah Issues on Ownership
in Asset-Based Sukuk as Implemented in the Islamic Debt Market, INT'L SHARI'AH
RESEARCH ACADEMY FOR ISLAMIC FIN. (2010), available at http://uaelaws.files.
wordpress.com/2012/03/critical-appraisal-of-shariah-issues-on-ownership-in-
asset-based-sukuk-as-implemented-in-the-islamic-debt-market. pdf; Solomon
Teague, Awaiting Sukuk Clarity, INT'L FIN. REV. (2010), http://www.
ifre.com/awaiting-sukuk-clarity/610385.article (introducing many of the same
considerations - legal and otherwise - addressed herein).
7. See Young Anti-Government Protesters Gather In Yemen, N.P.R. MORNING ED.
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/21/133932016/Yemen-Protests-
Update (describing protesters as educated yet unemployed twenty-somethings);
Arabian Gulf sukuk shunned by Asia on unrest, ARABIAN BUSINESS (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/arabian-gulf-sukuk-shunned-by-asia-on-unrest38
2091.html?utmsource=twitterfeed&utmmedium=twitter (reporting investor
avoidance of " [Shari'ah]-compliant debt in the Middle East as unrest escalates
across the region, causing concern that economic growth and investment will
slow."). This is to say that the economic growth predictions are bleak, suggesting a
vicious cycle of sociopolitical and economic unrest.
452 [Vol. 35:2
Where Does the Durham Stop in a Sukuk Default?
compelling reasons for why attention to the legal resolution of sukuk
defaults is warranted. One reason is strong global demand for
sukuk.8 This demand continues to grow in the wake of the recent
global credit crunch and ensuing liquidity crisis.9  Moreover,
demand is widespread across different forms of issuers (i.e.,
sovereign as well as corporate). 0 However, "until a sukuk default is
satisfactorily settled, uncertainty will cloud the market.""
8. See Neeta Thakur, Safe as Houses? Sukuk on the Rise, GULF BUSINESS (Dec. 30,
2011), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-276201938.html ("Sukuk
market exits 2011 in a jolly mood. Funds raised through Sukuk will rise three-fold
this year, to heights last enjoyed before the financial crisis."); 'Time is ripe'for Islamic
finance, INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTOR (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www. infrastructure
investor.com/Article.aspx?article=63991; How to set sukuk free, INT'L FIN. L. REV.
(Dec. 2007), http://www.iflr.com/Article/1976852/How-to-set-sukuk-free.html
("Demand for sukuk has been strong in recent years. The boom in oil prices has
delivered a cash windfall for Middle Eastern investors at a time when they are
becoming more meticulous in applying religious principles to their investments.
Since its birth in 2002, the sukuk market has grown remarkably. Standard & Poor's
recently estimated that the global market is worth over $80 billion The sukuk
market is expected to continue to grow, as more businesses seek to tap the liquid
petrodollars and the demand for [S]hari'ah-compliant product."). See also
Introduction to Islamic project finance, CLIFFORD CHANCE (Jan. 2009),
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2009/01/introdu
ction tolislamicprojectfinance0.html ("A key cornerstone of the Islamic finance
industry has been the development and growth of the sukuk market a market
which now has global reach and appeal to both Muslim and non-Muslim
investors.").
9. Sukuk market set to rebound says report, GULFBASE, (Jan. 18, 2011)
http://www.gulfbase.com/site/interface/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?n=164491
("The value of sukuk has jumped 61[%] in the past year, according to a research
[report] by Trowers & Hamlins, the international law firm. A total of $7 billion of
sukuk were issued in the year to June 2010 compared to $4.3 billion the previous
year.").
10. Jack Bunker, The Crucible of Islamic Finance: Dissolving IIG's $200[MM]
Sukuk, WESTLAW BUSINESS CURRENTS (July 25, 2010), http://currents.Westlaw
business.com/Article.aspx?id=a8736b6e-24be-4049-bb7a-a33559d5893c (discussing
a sukuk default by Kuwait's International Investment Group, a state-owned
Shari'ah-compliant investment company).
11. Robin Wigglesworth, Fears rise over Islamic bonds, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7e73fbOa-dac5-llde-933d-00144feabdcO,s01=1.html
#axzzlFgw5N27t. See also Muhammad Al-Bashir Muhammad Al-Amine, Sukuk
Market: Innovations and Challenges, ISLAMIC ECON. STUD. Vol. 15, No. 2, at 18 (Jan.
2008), available at http://www.irti.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelop
ments/Internet/ English/ IRTI/ CM/ downloads/IESArticles/ Vol15-2..MBashir
Alamin--SukukMarket.Innovation.pdf ("A properly functioning financial market
depends on the enforceability of the contracts concerned. Markets may thrive on
economic uncertainty, but not under legal ambiguity."). But see Yavar Moini,
Comparisons and differences between sukuk and conventional products, in SUKUK AND
ISLAMIC CAPITAL MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 47 (Rahail Ali ed., 2011) (suggesting
4532012]
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Uncertainty in the market can make it difficult for creditors or
lenders to assess risk, precluding wider participation and increasing
transaction or borrowing costs. For instance, it is conceivable that a
Shari'ah-compliant sovereign wealth fund reliant on sukuk capital
markets might experience difficulty in meeting capital
commitments.12  This might result in widespread uncertainty
around how to price related risk. It is thus in the global best interest
to clarify sukuk default mechanisms.
Finally, clarity is in investors' best interest. According to
Mohammed Khnifer, a prolific journalist specializing in Islamic
finance, originators previously "spent a lot of time on the matter of
credit enhancements (protecting banks) and very little time on
protecting investors' rights." 13 Given this Note's focus on how to
tightly structure secure investments and thereby foster sustainable
economic growth (and pave the way for socioeconomic stability),
thinking through sukuk default repercussions provides a promising
start.
II. Introduction to Islamic Finance and Sukuk
A. The Building Blocks
Islamic finance is rapidly evolving.14 According to Sheikh
Muhammad Taqi Usmani, a cleric and one of the world's leading
scholars of Islamic finance,15 "the basic difference between [a]
capitalist and Islamic economy is that in secular capitalism, the
Shari'ah-compliant credit default swaps as an effective way to mitigate default risk).
12. This scenario might warrant attention especially since sovereign Gulf-based
wealth funds were responsible for rescuing many financial institutions at the height
of the credit crunch. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Dishdashing to the Rescue, THE
ECONOMIST (Nov. 29, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10229471.
13. Mohammed Khnifer, Lex Islamicus: When Sukuk Default Asset Priority of
Certificate-holders vis a vis Creditors, OPALESQUE (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.
opalesque.com/OIF1181/LexIslamicusSukukDefaultAssetPriority8l.html.
14. Ehsun A. Zaidi, Overview of Islamic Capital Markets, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE 95 (outlining the growth of Islamic capital markets and the sukuk
product specifically). See also Islamic Finance Market Turns to Securitization, INT'L FIN.
L. REV. (July 2005) (outlining the market's evolution from humble beginnings); How
to set sukuk free, supra note 8 (forecasting continued growth in the sukuk space).
15. See Sri Lanka to launch first Islamic bank, NEW HORIZON: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
ON ISLAMIC BANKING & INSURANCE 6 (July - Sept. 2009), No. 172, available at
http://www.islamic-banking.com/resources/7/NewHorizonPreviouselssues/
NewHorizon_JulySep09.pdf (introducing Justice Taqi Usmani as a prominent
scholar).
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profit motive or private ownership are given unbridled power"
whereas in Islam they are restrained by divine injunctions. 16
The cardinal injunction is a prohibition against riba (interest),
which means that Shari'ah-compliant investments cannot be
structured as traditional debts for borrowed money.17  Why?
According to a prominent jurist, when
the whole economy turns into a debt-oriented economy... [it] not
only dominates over the real economic activities and disturbs its
natural functions by creating frequent shocks, but also puts the
whole mankind under the slavery of debt.18
Interest really means a predetermined return on money, rather
than a return that reflects exposure to the commercial activity for
which the financing is provided.19 Islamic financial philosophy
favors trade and the sharing of commercial risk, so it does not
sanction predetermined return without acceptance of commercial
risk by the financier. 20 As a result, Islamic financing institutions
have developed sophisticated interest-free banking transactions
based on concepts of partnership and profit-loss sharing.21
Second, Shari'ah prohibits gharar, which is an "unacceptable"
level of risk or uncertainty, so any Shari'ah financing transaction
must not be deemed speculative or otherwise uncertain.22 Thus, a
sale contract where the existence, price, quantity or material
characteristics of the asset are unknown or unspecified would not be
recognized under Shari'ah.23
One kind of uncertainty is that in outcome, and Shari'ah
16. Muhammad Taqi Usmani, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE xiv (2002).
17. Islamic Finance in the United States, LATHAM & WATKINS, LLP 1 (May 19,
2008), http://www.1w.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2191_ 1.pdf.
18. Rafe Haneef, Recent Trends and Innovations in Islamic Debt Securities: Prospects for
Islamic Profit and Loss Sharing Securities, in ISLAMIC FINANcE: CURRENT LEGAL AND
REGULATORY ISSUES 29 (S. Nazim Ali ed., 2005), available at http://www.rdis.ir/
RDFiles/IslamicFin/RecentTrends andInnovations inIslamic_DebtSecurities44.pd
f (citing MUHAMMAD TAQI USMANI, THE HISTORIC JUDGMENT ON INTEREST DELIVERED IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 36-37,87 (Idaratul Maarif ed., 2000)).
19. Anzal Mohammed & Hooman Sabeti-Rahmati, Understanding Islamic
Finance, ALLEN & OVERY, LLP (May 23, 2008), http://www.allenovery.com/
AOWEB/ Knowledge/ Editorial.aspx?contentTypelD=1 &itemlD=34362&prefLangl
D=410.
20. Id.
21. LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 17, at 1.
22. Id.
23. Mohamed & Sabeti-Rahmati, supra note 19.
4552012]
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accordingly forbids gambling or speculation. 24  Consequently,
conventional insurance, futures, and options contracts are
prohibited. 25 The result is that hedging risk with Islamic securities
can be more of a challenge than in conventional finance. Finally, a
Shari'ah-compliant transaction must not involve investments that are
haram or prohibited in Islam, 26 such as investments in gambling
operations, alcohol, or pork products.27
Put differently, Islamic finance prizes risk sharing in
furtherance of social and economic welfare. 28 This philosophy
considers the predetermined and fixed interest rate to be
exploitative on the borrower and instead favors a profit and loss
sharing arrangement between creditor and debtor.29 As a result,
Islamic debt capital marketS30 have evolved that bear certain
structural relevance to Western bond markets despite the Shari'ah
prohibition on interest-bearing debt instruments.31
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Michael J.T. McMillen, 25th Anniversary Symposium Issue: Article: Asset
Securitization Sukuk and Islamic Capital Markets: Structural Issues in These Formative
Years, 25 Wis. INT'L L.J. 703, 740 (2008) (outlining eligible asset classes).
27. LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 17, at 1.
28. Ali Adnan Ibrahim, Financial Innovations in the Muslim World: The Rise of
Customary Businesses in International Financial Markets: An Introduction to Islamic
Finance and the Challenges of International Integration, 23 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 661, 664
(2008).
29. Id.
30. Note that this Note looks primarily to the Gulf sukuk market, which is
distinct from the Malaysian market. See Sukuk: Pushing innovation, INT'L FIN. L. REV.
(Mar. 2009), http://www.iflr.com/Article/2117392/Sukuk-Pushing-innovation.
html (discussing the Malaysian market); Islamic Finance Market Turns to
Securitization, supra note 14 (discussing variance across the more developed
Malaysian sukuk market vis-A-vis the less homogeneous Middle Eastern sukuk
market). Note also that some literature is inaccessible to non-Arabic speakers, thus
limiting the authority of this Note. See Al-Amine, supra note 11, at 16-17
(discussing difficulties to harmonization efforts across the GCC and Malaysian
markets, adding that "the efforts by the two Academies have also their
shortcomings. For example, each of the two Academies is meeting only once a
year; they are not focusing on Islamic finance issues only and the involvement of
Muslim economists seems to be limited. Moreover, the papers and the discussions
are not accessible to English speaking practitioners as they are documented in
Arabic and the two institutions are lacking adequate resources for employing full-
time professional staff well versed in both the Shari'ah and finance.").
31. Ibrahim, supra note 28, at 708 ("Islamic law prohibits interest-bearing debt
instruments. However, some Islamic-law-compliant transactions do involve
debt...").
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B. The Buildings
The most prominent Islamic financial structures are: mudaraba
(profit-sharing), musharaka (partnership financing), murabaha (mark-
up financing), ijara (leasing), istisna'a (pre-production financing),32
and sukuk (Islamic bonds). This Note focuses on the latter.
A sukuk is essentially a fixed income security that functions like
a conventional bond but is structured in a Shari'ah-compliant
manner such that it resembles a trust certificate.33 Due to the
Sharia'ah prohibition on traditional interest-bearing debt,M sukuk are
not categorized as debt but rather represent a profit and risk sharing
partnership between the issuer and the investor. 35
The unique feature of a sukuk, as compared to a conventional
bond or a conventional structured note, is that the issuer of the
sukuk is also the trustee, but the issuer has no obligation
independent of the sukuk assets to pay because the sukuk is not an
IOU. . . .36
The basic framework underlying sukuk consists of a special
purpose vehicle (SPV) or distinct legal entity that issues sukuk37 (or
32. Nathan Piper, Assessing the Potential for Shari'ah-Compliant Project Finance in
India, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 418, 426 (2009).
33. LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 17, at 6. See also Islamic Finance Market Turns
to Securitization, supra note 14 ("Sukuk is frequently referred to as an Islamic bond,
but a more accurate translation of the Arabic word would be an Islamic investment
certificate. The distinction being that, at its simplest, a bond is a contractual debt
obligation whereby the issuer is contractually obliged to pay to bondholders, on
certain specified dates, interest and principal. In comparison, under a sukuk
structure the sukuk-holders each hold an undivided beneficial ownership interest in
the underlying assets. Consequently, sukuk-holders are entitled to share in the
revenues generated by the sukuk assets as well as being entitled to share in the
proceeds of the realization of the sukuk assets. The legal structure and form of sukuk
certificates may be considered analogous to US Trust Certificates and can be listed
and rated.").
34. Ibrahim, supra note 28.
35. LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 17.
36. Rahail Ali, An overview of the sukuk market, in SUKUK AND ISLAMIC CAPITAL
MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 17 (Rahail Ali ed., 2011).
37. Andrew Henderson, Testing the Water: The Dubai FSA Handles Its First Locally
Managed Sukuk, 26 INT'L FIN. L. REV., no. 9, 16 (Sept. 2007) ("The idea behind sukuk
(the plural of the Arab word sak, meaning certificate) is simple. The prohibition on
interest under [Shari'ah . .] makes the creation of a [Shari'ah]-compliant pure debt
security impossible. However, an obligation that is linked to the performance of a
real asset is acceptable. The [Shari'ahl accepts the validity of a financial asset that
derives its return from the performance of an underlying real asset or pool of
assets.").
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certificates) to investors in exchange for proceeds, which are then
used to purchase the pool of assets (typically Shari'ah-compliant
contracts) from the originator or original owner of the assets. 38 The
stream of income generated from the Shari'ah-compliant contracts or
assets is used to pay back the sukuk-holders. 39 The below graphic4o
illustrates an ijara sukuk structure whereby an issuer owning
Shari'ah-compliant assets transfers them into a trust or similar SPV,
which then sells sukuk (certificates of participation) to investors
while leasing back the assets to the issuer at a rate sufficiently high
to generate an agreeable profit for investors:
Ijara sukuk structure
Buy back of asset at maturity Rental payments/coupons
Sale of asset
Cash
IssuerSPV Islamic trwestos
Certifeaate o 7
of participation
Lease agreement
Rental payments Reimbursement of issue
price on maturity
Most Shari'ah scholars agree that the pool of assets should not
only be comprised of instruments only representing an interest in a
stream of payments (such as murabaha contracts), but rather should
be at least half comprised of instruments representing an interest in
the underlying assets themselves (like ijara).41 This is to say that
38. LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 17.
39. Id.
40. Rodney Wilson, Islamic Asset Management, SGIA RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS
SERIES (June 2007), http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/sgia/SGIARWPO7-01.2
doc.pdf.
41. Id.
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Shari'ah favors clear ownership interest in underlying assets rather
than simply the receivables arising thereunder. Thus according to
the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial
Institutions (AAOIFI), whose standards are generally followed by
issuers of sukuk, sukuk "may not be issued on a pool of
receivables." 42
III. Risk Factors - Asset-Backed and Other Considerations
A. Recharacterization Risk
Although sukuk are structured to generate a fixed return based
on the expected return of underlying assets (i.e., they are "asset-
based"), they do not always provide creditors with recourse to the
underlying assets themselves (i.e., they are not always truly "asset-
backed"). 43  Sukuk are often structured so that investors have
economic exposure to the credit risk of a corporate or sovereign
originator of assets and depend on that entity's solvency for their
return.44 Thus the credit ratings on such sukuk reflect the rating of
this entity (rather than the pool of assets).45 Therefore,
it is more accurate to refer to [these] sukuk as an asset-based
investment, as each investor owns an undivided interest in an
underlying tangible asset which can be structured to give a fixed-
income economic return in a Shari'ah-compliant manner. The
sukuk certificate evidences this ownership interest, but is not a
debt or bond in the "IOU" sense. In short, moneys raised by the
issue of the sukuk certificates are used to invest in an underlying
asset, a trust or agency is declared over the asset and the investor
thereby becomes an owner in a beneficial or indirect interest in
that asset in proportion to its investment, and is thus entitled to all
benefits that this entails, including a proportion of the return
generated by that asset.46
On the other hand, conventional asset-backed securities are
structured so that investors have exposure and recourse to the
underlying assets rather than to the originator. 47
42. Ibrahim, supra note 28, at 720.
43. Mohammed & Sabeti-Rahmati, supra note 19.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Debashis Dey & Stuart Ure, Islamic securitization, in SUKUK AND ISLAMIC
CAPITAL MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 146 (Rahail Ali ed., 2011).
47. Mohammed & Sabeti-Rahmati, supra note 19.
2012] 459
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The asset-based versus asset-backed distinction is only meant to
reflect the different risk profiles of each creditor; while asset-based
lenders/investors face borrower or counterparty credit risk, asset-
backed lenders/investors only face market and related asset risk on
the underlying portfolio and need not depend on the issuer's
solvency. 48 Moreover, just because a sukuk is asset-backed does not
mean that investors will in fact get unencumbered access to the
underlying assets; the legal documentation must clearly stipulate
that investors have true ownership and thus unlimited disposition
rights over the assets, sans limitation to cash flows or liquidation
restrictions. 49
Hence AAOIFI standards note that sukuk documentation must
explicitly abide by Shari'ah and that a Shari'ah board must monitor
its implementation.50 But "like most bonds, most sukuk issued today
are asset-based, which grants the certificate holder rights on a
portion of the cash flows. There are often no direct links to actual
assets, which is a condition of [Shari'ah]."5 Complicating matters is
the fact that much sukuk documentation imports conventional bond
default provisions,52 effectively blurring the line between a Shari'ah-
compliant risk sharing instrument and a conventional (Western) risk
transfer instrument.
Thus some lawyers who practice in the Islamic financial space
48. Wilson, supra note 5.
49. Sukuk it up: [Shari'ah]-compliant finance is not broken, but it is dented, THE
ECONOMIST (Apr. 17, 2010), at 82, http://www.economist.com/node/15908503
("Much more damaging is widespread confusion among sukuk investors about the
sorts of risks they were really taking on. A sukuk is structured to avoid the Islamic
prohibition on interest payments. It manages this by paying bondholders with the
cashflows generated by specific assets, which are put into a special-purpose
vehicle ... as part of the deal. Many seem to have thought that the bonds were
'asset-backed[,]' giving them a claim on the assets in the event of a default. Most
sukuk, however, are 'asset-based[,]' handing investors ownership of the cashflows
but not of the assets themselves. 'Many sukuk-holders have a perception that they
hold a security that is collateralised,' says Anouar Hassoune of Moody's, a rating
agency. 'In 90% of cases, that is incorrect.'").
50. Oliver Ali Agha & Claire Grainger, Sukuk: Default or No Default?, AGHA &
SHAMSI COMMENT (Jan. 2010), http://www.aghashamsi.com/downloads/Sukuk
DefaultArticle.pdf.
51. Khnifer, supra note 13. See also Debashis Dey & Stuart Ure, supra note 46, at
147 ("the vast majority of sukuk to date are not 'true securitizations', meaning that
investors have no claim against the assets during a default (unless there has been a
pledge of an asset) - this is the commercial basis on which the investment is
made.").
52. Agha & Grainger, supra note 50.
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have gone so far as to say that, "[c]learly, sukuk are meant to be
equity-type instruments: any references to sukuk as being Islamic
bonds are oxymoronic and misleading to investors who may believe
they have certain bond-like remedies that, ultimately, may not be
enforceable in some Islamic jurisdictions."5 3  Sheikh Usmani's
remarks that eighty-five percent of non-ijarah sukuk issuances are not
in compliance with Shari'ah echo this view 54 - and undermine the
credibility of the entire industry.55
This interpretation is informed by the AAOIFI's actions during a
recent controversy surrounding the [Shari'ah] compliance of
certain types of sukuk. In an influential 2007 paper, the Chairman
of the AAOIFI's Shari'ah Board, Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani,
argued that sukuk that guaranteed purchasers interest-free loans
and repurchase agreements in cases of missed payments or
default were not [Shari'ah]-compliant, as they effectively tied an
investor's returns to the creditworthiness of the issuer instead of
the value of the underlying assets in violation of gharar
restrictions. Later that year, Usmani made public statements that
as much as [eighty-five percent] of the world's sukuk could be
[Shari'ah]-noncompliant due to these and other measures,
triggering an intense controversy. After several months of debate,
the AAOIFI confirmed much of Usmani's analysis and issued new
sukuk guidelines prohibiting these practices. Tellingly, these
guidelines also admonished the [Shari'ah] supervisory boards that
had permitted such activities, reasserting their duty to "make sure
53. Id.
54. John Foster, How Sharia-compliant is Islamic banking?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11,
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8401421.stm ("The question's
pertinence was raised in March last year, when Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani,
of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Finance Institutions
(AAOIFI), a Bahrain-based regulatory institution that sets standards for the global
industry, said that 85% of Sukuk, or Islamic bonds, were un-Islamic. Usmani is the
granddaddy of modern-day Islamic finance, so having him make this statement is
synonymous with Adam Smith saying that free-markets are inefficient."). See also
Dubai's Escape from Default Escalates Sukuk Uncertainty, ASIAMONEY, Jan. 13, 2010,
http:/ / www.asiamoney.com/ Article/ 2371366/ Dubais-escape-from-default-
escalates-sukuk-uncertainty.html
55. But see Jack Bunker, Not Quite Cricket: High Court Drops Islamic Finance Ball?,
WESTLAW BUSINESS CURRENTS (Mar. 10, 2010), http://currents.westlaw
business.com/Article.aspx?id=1a3e4075-c705-4747-8938-1d7a0b330483 ("Of critical
importance is the fact that under Islamic law, nofatwa (decree) once duly issued by
an imam (scholar) or board of scholars, can be reversed or overturned. A noted
scholar, Sheik Taqi Usmani, famously declared that many sukuk structures are not
Shariah-compliant; the statement, however, had no actual effect on these
instruments - it amounted simply to dicta.").
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that the operation complies, at every stage, with [Shari'ah]
guidelines and requirements." As [AAOIFI Secretary-General
Mohamed] Alchaar later described, these actions effectively
"wrecked the market" for sukuk, leading to a decrease in overall
issuances and a dramatic shift toward less controversial ijara-
based sukuk structures. As institutions feared that consumers
would react negatively to the AAOIFI's public censure, they
rallied market forces that effectively curbed the offending
practices and triggered a more widespread reevaluation of sukuk
standards by issuers.56
Therefore "[u]nless it's specifically stated in the documentation,
a creditor's right is not typically to that cash-generating asset, which
is there chiefly to ensure Shari'ah compliance, but to the obligor's
balance sheet, which can be a very different proposition."57 "The
relationships are fairly well-defined: the obligor's obligations to
sukuk-holders rank pari passu with the other unsecured creditors, but
senior to equity holders."58
In the event of a default by the obligor or on maturity, the only
recourse available to sukuk-holders is to "put" the assets (or,
specifically, the beneficial interest that has been purchased) back to
the obligor, which creates a payment obligation in favour of sukuk-
holders. In this respect, sukuk-holders' claims on the obligor are
equivalent to those of other unsecured creditors on the basis that
sukuk-holders have no retention of title to the assets underpinning
the sukuk.59
Sukuk-holders have cause for concern that a sukuk structure
would be recharacterized as asset-based rather than asset-backed
only if, of course, they expect to face litigation in a Shari'ah-abiding
jurisdiction. This is a reasonable assumption because all sukuk
structures involve Shari'ah-abiding issuers,60 assets, 61 or investors. 62
56. Scott R. Anderson, Recent Development: Forthcoming Changes in the Shari'ah
Compliance Regime for Islamic Finance, 35 YALEJ. INT'L L. 237, 241-42 (2010).
57. Khnifer, supra note 13.
58. Daniel Rankin, Restructuring and buy-back of sukuk, in SUKUK AND ISLAMIC
CAPITAL MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 157 (Rahail Ali ed., 2011).
59. Yavar Moini, supra note 11, at 35.
60. Generally the issuer is an offshore special-purpose vehicle (structured this
way largely for tax purposes), in which case the documentation would likely
provide for English or New York governing law. See How to set sukuk free, supra
note 8. However, the largest sukuk default to date, which was not litigated but
rather swiftly restructured, involved an issuer "incorporated in the Jabel Ali Free
Zone, subjecting the sale or lease of the collateral assets to [S]hari'ah-based United
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This is because sukuk exist to broker the demand of financiers and
Shari'ah-abiding investors. 63 This demand continues to grow.64
Although many contracting parties select arbitration, which is
enforceable in some jurisdictions like parts of the United Arab
Emirates, 65 or alternatively opt to restructure sukuk on the brink of
or post-default, 66 a large enough sukuk with disparate stakeholders
Arab Emirates (UAE) law as applied by Dubai courts." Heiko Hesse and Andreas
Jobst, Debriefing Nakheel - Wider Implications for the Sukuk Market, RouBINi GLOBAL
EcoN. (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.roubini.com/financemarkets-monitor/258811/
debriefing-nakheel -_wider implications for the sukuk market.
61. See Dominic O'Neill, Islamic finance: Sukuk market on trial as Islamic bonds
default, EUROMONEY (July 2009), http:// www.euromoney.com/Article/224556 2 /
BackIssue/72526/Islamic-finance-Sukuk-market-on-trial-as-Islamic-bonds-
default.html ("As most [sukuk] were issued by offshore special purpose vehicles
governed by English law, a ruling would have to be sought in an English court.
This would then need to be enforced in the Middle East, the location of most of the
assets of sukuk issuers.").
62. See Kristen A. Bell & Ann Saegert, Basic Primer on [Shari'ah]-Compliant
Finance, HAYNES & BOONE LLP (Oct. 17-19, 2008), http://www.haynes
boone.com/files/Publication/1fl30179-11fa-4858-96ae-248674baf629/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/17lddd6l-e465-43fb-a4d5-ae74ab0cf6a3/BasicPrimeron
ShariaCompliantFinance.pdf (describing the East Cameron Gas sukuk structure,
which was a capital-raising designed to tap Shari'ah-abiding investors, but which
otherwise involved assets and issuers in Texas) and Khnifer, supra note 13
(reporting that East Cameron Partners, the defaulting originator in the sukuk, lost
out to sukuk-holders when the United States judge issued a decision granting sukuk
certificate holders full and exclusive ownership and possession of the assets. "As a
matter of U.S. law, the result is the treatment of the SPV assets as being the product
of a true sale. This essentially meant that the SPV did in fact own the assets, and
was not merely a collateral holder for secured loans.").
63. Introduction to Islamic Project Finance, CLIFFORD CHANCE (Jan. 2009),
http://www.cliffordchance.com/publicationviews/publications/2009/01/introdu
ction to islamicprojectfinance0.html.
64. Muhammad Al-Bashitr Muhammad Al-Amine, supra note 11 ("The size of
global [Shari'ah-compliant] assets is estimated at about $400 billion to $500 billion.
Institutions like Standard & Poor's Ratings Services believe that the potential
market for Islamic financial services is closer to $4 trillion, meaning that Islamic
finance currently has only achieved about 10% of its potential and therefore still has
a long way to go. The market share of Islamic financial institutions is estimated to
stand at 12 per cent in Malaysia and 17 per cent in the six GCC countries where it is
growing faster than anywhere else").
See also Bilal Aquil & Imran Mufti, Innovation in the Global Sukuk and Legal
Structuring Considerations, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 101 (Rahail Ali
ed., 2008).
65. Doing Business in the United Arab Emirates, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Jan.
2009), http:/ / www.1w.com/ upload/ pubContent/ pdf/ pub2783_1.PDF.
66. See generally Omar Salah, Dubai Debt Crisis: A Legal Analysis of the Nakheel
Sukuk, 4 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. PUBLICIST (2010) (very helpful analysis of the $3.52
billion Nakheel sukuk issued to finance the World and Palm islands).
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could conceivably end up in litigation.67
There is little clarity in such a default scenario. What is settled
is that Dubai, for one, would prioritize secured creditors (although it
is unclear how they would rank amongst themselves),68 whereas
courts in the Emirate's free zone (the International Financial Centre
or "DIFC") would lump secured and unsecured creditors together
after preferred creditors.69  Preferred creditors are generally:
pensioners; employees in the four months preceding liquidation;
those owed any payments due in lieu of notice, or in respect of
accrued holiday entitlement.70 The DIFC is not, however, the only
Shari'ah-abiding jurisdiction,71  and there are significant
inconsistencies within and among Shari'ah-abiding jurisdictions as
to the validity and enforceability of sukuk72 - and related judgments
rendered abroad.73
67. See Robin Wigglesworth, Fresh suits filed in Saudi dispute, ZAWYA (Apr. 12,
2011),http://ae.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20110413053754/?relcontent=20
110922 6118 906 (discussing multi-jurisdictional litigation in the Saad-Algosaibi
matter).
68. Daniel Rankin, supra note 58, at 162-63 ("In the GCC, where the insolvency
regimes are uncertain, . . .have developed unevenly and are generally untested and
therefore unpredictable . . . due to the lack of precedent, there exists no definitive
priority ranking of creditors and no way to determine how creditors will be paid in
the event of a liquidation of the obligor's assets. There is also little guidance on the
relative length of an insolvency proceeding or how it will be carried out in practice.").
See also Restructuring and Insolvency in the United Arab Emirates, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP
(Mar. 2010), http://www.1w.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/pub2881_l.pdf.
69. Restructuring and Insolvency in the Dubai International Financial Centre,
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Mar. 2010), http://www.1w.com/upload/pubContent/
pdf/pub2880_1.pdf.
70. Id.
71. See Islamic Finance Market Turns to Securitization, supra note 14 (highlighting
the relatively more-developed Malaysian market).
72. Henderson, supra note 37, at 17 ("[A] [Shari'ah] scholar seeking to rule on the
compliance with the [Shari'ah] would not look to the manner in which the product
is classified or described from a secular or conventional, that is, non-Islamic, point
of view. For the [Shari'ah] scholar, conventional labels or descriptions may be
viewed as irrelevant: the important thing is whether, according to the [Shari'ah], the
product in question is such that the scholar can, in good conscience, issue the
appropriate fatwa. This, in turn, goes to a more fundamental issue in the context of
the regulation of Islamic finance, generally: the [Shari'ah] as an internalized system
of rules, that is, one that is interpreted by a local Islamic scholar whose views reflect
those of the local community, makes it difficult for an outside agency, such as a
financial service regulator, which relies on an externalized system of rules, that is,
one fixed by the regulator in its legislative capacity, to seek to regulate the outcome
of decisions made on the basis of the [Shari'ah].").
73. Agha & Grainger, supra note 50 ("When defaults in market sukuk structures
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In light of potential hurdles at the litigation and enforceability
stages, the risks associated with strict as opposed to "sham" 74
compliance with Shari'ah become significant in structuring sukuk.
This is because the risk of recharacterization 5 is relatively high
given unclear 6 bankruptcy regimes in Shari'ah-abiding jurisdictions.
This is owed in part to the fact that Shari'ah law "doesn't even
contemplate a default, because you can't default if all you're ever
giving is a profit share. If there are no profits, then you aren't
defaulting."7 7
This fundamental risk of re-characterization both turns on and
translates into a host of other related risk factors. 78 Essentially, this
note's position is that murkiness regarding ostensibly Shari'ah-
compliant legal instruments, like fatwa-sanctioned sukuk, breeds
uncertainty in other legal tribunals as to the treatment and
recognition thereof.79 Thus, to the extent sukuk are conventional
bonds transformed into Shari'ah-compliant securities, they might be
expected to stand in either legal regime. But this expectation may be
unreasonable, because the ideologies undergirding each system are
fundamentally different. This is why some commentators have
remarked that, "referring to sukuk as Islamic bonds is like jamming a
square peg into a round hole and then wondering why it doesn't
fit."80
result from contractual covenants imported from conventional bonds, such defaults
would not necessarily be enforceable in a Shari'ah adjudication, regardless of
decisions made in foreign courts.").
74. Willem Buiter, Islamic Finance Principles to Restore Policy Effectiveness, FIN.
TIMES (July 22, 2009), http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/07/islamic-finance-
principles-to-restore-policy-effectiveness/.
75. See also Solomon Teague, Awaiting Sukuk Clarity, INT'L FIN. REv. (2010),
http://www.ifre.com/awaiting-sukuk-clarity/610385.article.
76. Gulf States Urged to Reform 'Archaic' Bankruptcy Laws, ZAWYA (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.zawya.com/Story.cfm/sidZAWYA20110125033453/Gulf%20states%2
Ourged%20to%20reform%20'archaic'%20bankruptcy%201aws%20.
77. O'Neill, supra note 61.
78. See Michael J.T. McMillen, Symposium: Islamic Business and Commercial Law:
Contractual Enforceability Issues: Sukuk and Capital Markets Development, 7 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 427, 452-58 (2007) (in-depth treatment of these and other risk factors).
79. See Bunker, supra note 10 (reporting on the decision of the English High
Court of Justice in Investment Dar Co. KSCC v. Blom Developments Bank SAL
(Dec. 11, 2009), which effectively challenges the very structure of an instrument
duly approved by a competent Shari'ah board - in spite of a written agreement to
the contrary).
80. Agha & Grainger, supra note 50.
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B. Other Risks
With the risk of recharacterization in the forefront, we return to
risks that sukuk structures will be invalidated in part or in toto. If the
sukuk involves Western arrangers or investors, they are likely to
structure it pursuant to principles of Western finance, which
involves setting up a bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle
(SPV), typically offshore, to house the assets.81  Sukuk-holders'
recourse to the underlying assets in this type of sukuk default would
depend in part on the strength and content of a legal opinion from
law firms' experts in local and international law as to how the law
would be expected to operate in a default scenario pursuant to the
stipulated choice of forum and choice of law.82
Sukuk-holders' recourse would also depend on whether a true
sale opinion could be procured attesting to the SPV's true (as
opposed to conditional or secured) ownership of the assets.83
Moreover, if the issuing SPV is governed by or incorporated in a
Shari'ah jurisdiction, these opinions might not prove foolproof. To
illustrate the complex legal hurdles a sukuk might face, we explore
the recent first non-payment of an Islamic bond in the Middle East:
the $100 million sukuk issued by Kuwaiti firm The Investment Dar
(TID) in 2005.84
IV. Case Study: TID
On May 12, 2009, Kuwaiti firm The Investment Dar became the
first Gulf Cooperation Council-based (GCC) sukuk issuer to
default.85 The Aston Martin part owner86 is not only the first Persian
Gulf company to default on Islamic bonds, but its sukuk structures
are somewhat typical in that transaction documents are "governed
by English law and subject to the jurisdiction of the English
81. Rustum Shah, Islamic Syndications: Legal and Structuring Considerations, in
ISLAMIC FINANCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 55-65.
82. Khnifer, supra note 13.
83. Id.
84. O'Neill, supra note 61.
85. Blake Goud, The TID Sukuk Default, BUSINESS ISLAMICA (July 26, 2009),
http:/ / www.islamica-me.com/ article.asp?cntnt=351.
86. Haris Anwar & Michael Patterson, Aston Martin Owner Is First to Default on
Gulf Sukuk, BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiqLWO5lD9c.
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Courts,"8 7 as is the case with the majority of GCC sukuk.88 This
permits some extrapolation.
Reviewing TID's Global Sukuk I Offering Memorandum 89
reveals no relevant ambiguities: the first risk factor clearly states
that if there is a default, investors have no direct recourse to the
underlying assets and have to rely on the obligor (TID) to
repurchase the sukuk.90 This TID sukuk, like most, provides investors
with limited recourse to the underlying assets insofar as they are
beneficial owners but they cannot directly dispose of the underlying
assets should TID default. 91 What this means is that while sukuk-
holders in this case can in fact sell the assets in a default scenario,
they cannot do so directly but must go through TID by exercising a
repurchase or put option. Effectively then, they risk lining up with
other TID creditors in the default scenario. In fact, the Offering
Circular says as much:
TID represents and warrants, among other things, that its
payment obligations. .. are and will be direct and unconditional,
ranking at least pari passu with all its other unsecured and
unsubordinated debts other than those mandatorily preferred by
law.92
Presumably this is why sukuk-holders passed a resolution on
June 7, 2010, stating that, "the Certificateholders would in due
87. See TID Global Sukuk I Limited Offering Circular, NASDAQ DUBAI 9 (2008),
http://www.nasdaqdubai.com/resources/2008/5/5/c4feeea4-blda-4201-bb32cOba
441dc92e/ExecutioncopyjTIDOC&Financials.pdf. Although this is a different
offering circular for a different sukuk issuance, it is likely representative of TID's
offering documentation, especially with respect to choice of forum and choice of
law elections. See O'Neill, supra note 61.
88. Yavar Moini, supra note 11, at 42 ("The purchase undertaking is usually
governed by English law on account of its creditor friendliness"); Rahail Ali and
Imran Mufti, Legal and structural anatomy of a sukuk, in SUKUK AND ISLAMIC CAPITAL
MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 53 (Rahail Ali ed., 2011) ("The governing law for the
declation of trust is usually English law"); Mazen Boustany & Muhammad
Syamsulfaiz Zainuddin, What went wrong? Credit crisis and Islamic finance, THE IN-
HoUSE LAWYER (June 10, 2010), http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/
united-arab-emirates/ 8069-what-went-wrong-credit-crisis-and-islamic-finance.
89. Again, this Offering Memorandum (OM) is for a distinct $150 million
offering from 2006 that listed on the Dubai Exchange, whereas Part III opens by
discussing the TID default on its earlier $100 million 2005 offering that listed
exclusively on the Kuwaiti Exchange and for which the OM could not be located.
90. TID Global Sukuk I Limited Offering Circular, supra note 87, at 11.
91. The TID Sukuk Default, supra note 85.
92. TID Global Sukuk I Limited Offering Circular, supra note 87, at 4.
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course like to further consider the potential of asserting priority
claims in respect of the Sukuk Assets." 93 The legal effect of such an
ex post facto resolution is unclear.
Complicating matters is the fact that the assets, vehicles to be
purchased from TID and leased pursuant to a musharaka (joint
venture) agreement, appear to be in Kuwait.94 This is to say that
even a favorable judgment for sukuk-holders in an English court
might be compromised at the enforceability stage, since Kuwait
does not appear to have reciprocal agreements with England to
honor each other's court judgments.95 This is all to say that in the
case of TID, "it appears that although the investors ... invested in
an asset-based sukuk, they are essentially unsecured creditors. The
Offering Circular provides them with a return of principal upon
default, but it does not provide them with recourse to the
underlying assets." 96
Notwithstanding ultimate enforceability hurdles, an interesting
development in the TID default might shed light on English
treatment of the transaction. Sukuk-holders (now restructuring),97
unsurprisingly are not the only casualties in TID's bankruptcy. TID
had a separate wakala (agency-like) arrangement with Lebanese-
incorporated Blom Bank,98 which provided that TID would invest
Blom deposits in a Shari'ah-compliant manner.99 The arrangement
93. The TID Sukuk Default, supra note 85.
94. TID Global Sukuk I Limited Offering Circular, supra note 87, at 47. See also
TID's Interim Condensed Financial statements attached to the executed Offering
Memorandum, indicating that TID and its subsidiaries are incorporated in Kuwait.
Id.
95. Kuwait Office, Kuwait: Enforcing Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards in
Kuwait, AL TAMIMI & CO. (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://www.mondaq.com/
article.asp?articleid=97072 ("While the law permits courts in Kuwait to issue an
order for the execution of judgments rendered in a foreign jurisdiction under
limited circumstances, the Kuwaiti courts are generally not in the practice of
enforcing foreign judgments.").
96. The TID Sukuk Default, supra note 85.
97. TID Global Sukuk I Limited Restructuring Update, ZAWYA (Feb. 21, 2011),
http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidZAWYA20110222070635/TID%20Global%2
OSukuk%201%20Limited%20-%2ORestructuring%2OUpdate.
98. Michael Godden & Neil D. Miller, The implications for the Islamic finance
market of the Investment Dar Company KSCC v Blom Developments Bank SAL, (Mar. 16,
2010), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4e91259a-6111-
442e-b397-d69e41e68115.
99. Id.
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was similarly governed by English law.100 At the end of the
investment period, TID was obligated to repay the capital together
with an agreed anticipated return, regardless of whether or not the
capital sum generated a profit for TID.101
TID failed to fulfill its payment obligations under the
arrangement and Blom sought, and was granted, summary
judgment in the amount of the capital sum but not on the agreed
anticipated return.102 TID appealed the summary judgment arguing
that the arrangement was ultra vires (thus invalid) since TID was in
fact accepting interest-bearing deposits as prohibited by Shari'ah and
by TID's bylaws - notwithstanding the fact that the transaction had
been approved by a Shari'ah advisory board!103
The High Court of Justice Chancery Division allowed the
appeal,104 "effectively invalidat[ing] an industry estimated to be
worth approximately $1[TR]." 105 "By maintaining that if "at least to
some eyes," Islamic finance appears to bring about "the payment of
interest under another guise," the court effectively gives the world
at large plenary power to veto any Islamic [Shari'ah] board."106
Sukuk-holders thus seem to face the additional risk that their
investment structure will be deemed invalid, even in a Western
court and notwithstanding English choice of law provisions - all
owing to Shari'ah transactional elements or requirements that may
further complicate the structure.
In sum, true recourse to assets in a sukuk is crucial in a default
scenario for sukuk-holders, 07 and arguably with respect to most
Shari'ah-compliant financial instruments - in part because it falls out
of the fundamental Shari'ah prohibitions on interest-bearing debt
and uncertainty. Of course asset-based or unsecured sukuk exist -
100. Wakala contracts: what are the implications of the judgment in TID v Blom?,
ALLEN & OVERY (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/AreasOf
Expertise/ Editorial.aspx?contentTypelD=1&itemlD=55078&prefLanglD=410.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Investment Dar Co KSCC v Blom Developments Bank Sal [2009] EWHC
3545 (Ch).
105. Bunker, supra note 55.
106. Id.
107. The AAOIFI's 2008 pronouncement on the matter squares with Sheikh
Usmani's statements that the majority of sukuk are not in compliance with Shari'ah.
See Scott R. Anderson, supra note 56.
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they are just not in strict compliance with Shari'ah'08 and so carry
recharacterization risk, which means creditors will likely have to
share the pie with creditors of the defaulting debtor.
V. A Look Into The Future: Restructuring on the Horizon
A. Nakheel's Restructuring
While the initial TID sukuk default was unlikely to move
markets given its relatively small notional value ($100 million),
more issuances are in the pipeline. "Despite the crisis, the [Shari'ah]-
compliant banking industry has been expanding. In a situation of
stress it has still grown by 20% - and just imagine how much more it
will grow once the situation stabilises and liquidity returns," says
Anouar Hassoune, Moody's vice-president of Middle East
banking.109 In the face of continued legal ambiguity, many similarly
positioned cash-strapped entities are restructuring their debts, as
TID moved to do on more than eighty percent of its debts valued at
$3.8 billion, including the $100 million sukuk debt.110
Thus taking a bird's eye view reveals that most near or in
default are restructuring their debts rather than risking high-stakes
legal refuge in a Shari'ah-abiding jurisdiction.111 The most
significant such restructuring was of Dubai-incorporated Nakheel
Development Limited's ("Nakheel") $3.52 billion debt.
In December 2006, Nakheel issued the largest sukuk to date,
designed to capitalize Nakheel PJSC, the company responsible for
landmark developments such as The Palm, Jumeirah, and The
108. Unfortunately fatwas, if public, do not always disclose scholars' reasoning as
to how unsecured sukuk pass Shari'ah muster. See CIMB ISLAMIC SHARI'AH COMM.,
Cherating Capital Limited Shariah Endorsement, available at http://www.bursa
malaysia.com/website/bm/market information/listed-bonds/downloads/ Cherat
ingCaiptal LtdShariah Endorsement.pdf (endorsing an issuance notwithstand-
ing explicit recourse to the obligor rather than the issuer).
109. James Gavin, Gulf Islamic banks gear up for change, THE BANKER (Feb. 2010),
http://www.thebanker.com/World/Middle-East/Gulf-Islamic-banks-gear-up-for-
a-change?ct=true.).
110. Robin Wigglesworth, TID restructuring talks break down, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29,
2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/42537f82-fbO9-lldf-b576-00144feab49a,sOl=
1.html#axzzlFC4f5Fmr.
111. See Defaults in Islamic Finance: A [Shari'ah] Perspective: Timeline of Key Events,
DAR AL ISTITHMAR 2 (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.daralistithmar.com/files/
Defaults% 20in%20Islamic%20Finance % 20- % 20A% 20Shari'a% 20perspective.pdf.
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World.112 While Nakheel is a subsidiary of Dubai World, a holding
company that manages and supervises a portfolio of businesses and
projects for the Government of Dubai,n 3 the Dubai government has
no legal obligation to repay the debts of government-related entities,
including Nakheel and its parent Dubai World. 114 Complicating
matters is the fact that the underlying assets (land) are in Dubai but
arguably owned by the sovereign and thus subject to sovereign
immunity"15 in attachment.116 Fortunately for creditors however
(though unfortunately for the sake of developing legal precedent),
neighboring Emirate Abu Dhabi intervened with a $10 billion loan,
a portion of which was used to prevent a Nakheel sukuk default.117
Creditor recourse to restructuring makes sense given the lack of
legal clarity in the Gulf around defaults." 8 Should this lack of
clarity persist, some predict a future of Islamic finance in name only,
yet structured in conformity with Western financial principles." 9
In sum, we know that Islamic finance is here to stayl20 and
112. Largest Sukuk Ever, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (Jan. 2007), http://www.iflr.com/
Article/ 1977366/ Largest-sukuk-ever.html?Print=true.
113. Id.
114. Sovereign Sukuk Reigns Supreme, ISLAMIC FIN. ASIA (Apr. 2010),
http://www.islamicfinanceasia.com/article.asp?nm-id=18745.
115. One fascinating area of legal ambiguity is sovereign debt restructuring, which
presents even more hurdles and in respect of which Professor Schwarcz makes a very
compelling case for a supranational solution. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 956 (2000).
116. See Salah, supra note 66 for an excellent discussion of the Nakheel sukuk
structure and Dubai-specific legal hurdles.
117. Brian Baxter, Ashurst, Clifford Chance, Latham Leading on Latest Dubai Debt
Restructuring, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.
law.com/jsp/law/ international/ LawArticlelntl.jsp?id=1202446902819&slreturn=1.
118. See Dubai's Escape from Default Escalates Sukuk Uncertainty, supra note 54, at
114 ("But if a sukuk goes wrong, it's not clear what rights creditors have to the
underlying assets . . . . The majority of sukuk are unsecured paper, and there is no
expectation whatsoever on the part of the creditors for using the underlying asset to
get back their money . . . . That asset is just there in a transaction to make it Shariah-
compliant. It is never intended to be collateral .... One of the major things that is
missing in the Gulf is the bankruptcy law.").
119. See generally McKean James Evans, Note, The Future of Conflict Between
Islamic and Western Financial Systems: Profit, Principle and Pragmatism, 71 U. PITr. L.
REV. 819 (2010).
120. See Heather Timmons, Dubai Crisis Tests Laws of Islamic Financing, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/business/global/01
islanic.html ("The surge in Islamic finance has led to hiring sprees at banks, and
given rise to a series of new financial indicators like the Dow Jones Islamic Market
index. Hoping to appeal to the Middle East's huge sovereign wealth funds, even
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swiftly growing,1 2 1 but suffers from fundamental structural
impediments that preclude legal certainty in and among Shari'ah-
abiding jurisdictions. The latter characteristic is owing to the fact
that muftis (Islamic law scholars) on Shari'ah advisory boards may
disagree on transactional compliance much in the same way as
ratings agencies in conventional finance. 122  Furthermore, the
existence of at least four main schools of Islamic thought1 23 enhances
legal variance across jurisdictions, compounding or at least further
complicating the scholar-shopping phenomenon.124
B. In the Wake of Nakheel
So what are the broader global implications? To facilitate
speculation, we return to the sovereign wealth fund default
hypothetical introduced supra.125 As it turns out, this scenario is not
so far-fetched. For one, even if Nakheel's debts had been fully
guaranteed by the Dubai Government, would that have helped had
Abu Dhabi not stepped in? No. Moreover, we know that
sovereigns do in fact default.126 Even more to the point, we know
non-Islamic institutions have started to raise money using Islamic finance.").
121. See Stuart Flynn, An Islamic Capitalism, INT'L FIN. L. REV. (July 2008),
http://www.iflr.com/Article/1976391/An-Islamic-capitalism.html.
122. But see David Segal, Suddenly, the Rating Agencies Don't Look Untouchable,
N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/business/
23rating.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1 (reporting on consumer litigation against the
three main rating agencies, which all but have a government-sanctioned monopoly
on blessing financial transaction structures - and which all effectively awarded
Lehman Brothers unsecured debt instruments ratings reflecting risk-free
investments).
123. Islamic Finance Market Turns to Securitization, supra note 14.
124. Id. (discussing variance across the more developed Malaysian sukuk market
vis-A-vis the less homogeneous Middle Eastern sukuk market). See also Foster, supra
note 54 ("We create the same type of products that we do for the conventional
markets. We then phone up a Sharia scholar for a Fatwa [seal of approval,
confirming the product is Shari'ah compliant]. 'If he doesn't give it to us, we phone
up another scholar, offer him a sum of money for his services and ask him for a
Fatwa. We do this until we get Sharia compliance. Then we are free to distribute
the product as Islamic."); 'Rock star' scholars a risk for Islamic finance, THE MALAYSIAN
INSIDER (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/business/article/
rock-star-scholars-a-risk-for-islamic-finance/.
125. See supra Introduction.
126. Argentina's debt restructuring: A victory by default?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 3,
2005), http://www.economist.com/node/3715779 ("Indeed, capital markets
appear to have a remarkably short memory. Argentina has defaulted on its foreign
debts five times in the past 175 years; Brazil seven times; and Venezuela nine times.
A debtor can default no more than once, unless a creditor is willing to forgive and
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that their wealth funds also default. 127 Indeed this seems somewhat
perverse or ironic since sovereign wealth funds both serve as a sort
of domestic/locall 28 and globall 29 economic stopgap in times of
crisis. On the other hand, this is completely consistent with
sovereign wealth funds' objectives to identify investments in both
bear and bull markets. We know however, that sovereign wealth
funds are swiftly returning to market.o30 It is therefore prudent to
think through the implications of a default scenario.
One important implication is global - what could the lack of
legal clarity mean for socioeconomic stability? Irrespective of
whether future sukuk structures are issued in true compliance with
Shari'ah or in name only, the continued lack of clarity on the horizon
as to how to treat the instruments suggests most creditors will
continue taking matters into their own hands by privately
restructuring. Is this a bad thing? Not necessarily.
However, private restructuring of debt that affects the public
welfare may not square with underlying principles of Shari'ah.
Sovereign debt restructuring clearly falls into this category, but
capital raising by quasi-sovereign entities like Nakheel and even
private entities like TID still affects public welfare; their activities
affect the housing and auto sectors in Dubai and Kuwait
respectively. At the very bottom, their capital raising activities
translate into more or less homes and cars for their constituents (or
consumers).
Islam's prohibition on riba is unambiguous and categorically
stated in the Qur'an: "Those who devour riba (interest) will not
forget. Amnesia sometimes sets in remarkably quickly. The bad loans that
Argentina inherited from the debt crisis of the 1980s were written down in 1992.
Just three years later, Argentina was carrying more foreign debt, both in absolute
terms and relative to the size of its GDP, than it had in 1991.").
127. Ron Fraser, From Sovereign Wealth to Sovereign Debt, THE TRUMPET (Feb. 25,
2010), http://www.thetrumpet.com/?q=7011.5538.0.0.
128. Grace Wyler, Illinois Looks To Sovereign Wealth Funds To Help Pay Off Pension
Debt, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/ illinois-
looks-sovereign-wealth-funds-to-help-pay-off-pension-debt-2011-2.
129. Josiane Kremer, Norway Buys Greek Debt as Sovereign Wealth Fund Sees No
Default, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 9, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-
08/norway-buys-greek-debt-as-sovereign-wealth-manager-anticipates-no-default.
html.
130. Giles Turner, Sovereign wealth funds take an active approach, E-FIN. NEWS (Jan.
25, 2011), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-01-25/sovereign-wealth-
funds-keep-it-active.
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stand except as stands one whom the devil hath driven to madness
by (his) touch."131 According to Sheikh Usmani, the divine
injunctions against riba, gharar and haram activities "combined
together have a cumulative effect of maintaining balance,
distributive justice and equality of opportunities." 132 It is reasonable
to consider the wider impact of privately negotiated debt
restructurings, insofar as the public for whom much of the capital
was raised might very well lack a seat at the negotiation table. This
might not serve the public welfare, and risks professionalizing the
Islamic financial space to the detriment of the retail investor. This
might in turn translate into socioeconomic inequality and unrest.
Although some argue that Islamic finance is customer driven,133 Will
it stay this way?
VI. Conclusion
Some argue that the uncertainty around sukuk default comes
not from the transactional structure but from, at least in the case of
Nakheel, Dubai's legal system.134 This note posits that an additional
important consideration is whether the sukuk complies with Shari'ah
such that it provides for clear recourse to assets rather than to the
obligor. This means that the sukuk structure must provide for true
profit sharing, which proscribes interest in the conventional sense
(predetermined rate of return) and prescribes instead a return tied
to the underlying commercial activity for which the financing is
provided.135 Thus to mitigate risk, sukuk documentation should
reflect clear ownership interest in the underlying assets rather than
131. See Islamic Finance Market Turns to Securitization, supra note 14 (quoting from
the Qur'an).
132. Usmani, supra note 16, at xiv.
133. Gavin, supra note 109 ("'Islamic finance is customer driven. It is not
something pushed by banks or regulators or by the edict of a king. And consumer
behaviour has essentially changed the behaviour of the corporate world,' says Mr
Fakih.").
134. See Salah, supra note 66, at 19 ("However, contrary to most expectations, the
main legal issues had nothing to do with the Islamic financial structure underlying
the Nakheel Sukuk; the issues were more inherent to the legal system of the United
Arab Emirates (UAE).").
135. Mohamed & Sabeti-Rahmati, supra note 19. See also Understanding Islamic
Finance, ALLEN & OVERY LLP (May 23, 2008), http://
www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial.aspx?contentTypelD=1&ite
mID=34362&prefLangID=410.
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simply the receivables arising thereunder.136 Legal characterization
of a sukuk as asset-backed or asset-based impacts sukuk-holders'
rights in a default scenario should litigation involve a Shari'ah
tribunal. While this depends on a robust legal regime for
enforceability, among other considerations, parties' intent to enter
into a Shari'ah-compliant sukuk ought to be clearly articulated in
relevant documentation. If anything is certain in the legal world of
Islamic finance, it is that financial instruments must be tied to
underlying assets, 137 because money is merely "a medium of
exchange"138 and "sukuk are, above all, ethically driven."139 The
further sukuk structures veer from this principle, the less likely they
are to be approved by Shari'ah-governed tribunals - in part or in
whole. Notably, this structuring strategy disadvantages issuers who
do not have assets with which to collateralize a sukuk. Although this
has been recently addressed by substitution of the underlying asset
during the life of the sukuk,140 difficulties remain in the unsecured
debt space.
136. Debashis Dey & Stuart Ure supra note 46, at 148 ("In order for the
instruments ultimately evidencing an investment in an asset-backed transaction to
achieve the appropriate credit rating, the transfer or sale of assets must be a sale
which would survive the insolvency of the original obligor (i.e., the assets must be
isolated from the bankruptcy estate of the obligor). This is achievable only to the
extent that the transfer represents a true transfer of ownership which is legally
perfected."); id. at 154 ("In order for existing sukuk transactions to embrace fully the
concept of risk following transfer of asset ownership, the structures require, among
other things, a true of perfected sale of assets by the owner of such assets and for
the investors to take true economic risk on performance of the assets themselves.").
137. Id.
138. Ibrahim, supra note 28, at 661.
139. Rahail Ali, supra note 36, at 20.
140. See Al-Amine supra note 11, at 7-11 (discussing DAAR sukuk I & II
structures).
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VII. Glossaryl4'
Dirham: A unit of currency in several Arab nations, and
formerly the related unit of mass (the Ottoman dram) in the
Ottoman Empire and Persian states.
Fatwa: A non-binding legal verdict or pronouncement based on
fiqh, given by a Shari'ah scholar or Shari'ah board.
Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence.
Gharar: Uncertainty, chance or risk; ambiguity and uncertainty
in transactions.
Hadith: Sayings and practices of the Prophet Mohammed (peace
be upon him).
Haram: An act or product that is unlawful or prohibited in
Islam.
Ijara: A lease - literally means "to give something on rent."
Istisna'a: Sale of an asset to be produced.
Mudaraba: Akin to a silent partnership or investment trust
management, with the rub ul-maal providing capital of the mudaraba
and the mudarib using its skill and enterprise in investing that
capital.
Mudarib: The person who provides entrepreneurship and
management of a mudaraba. Rub al-maal are the investors or
providers of capital of the mudaraba.
Mufti: One who issues fatwas.
Murabaha: Sale at cost plus agreed and stated profit.
Musharaka: Partnership or joint venture.
Riba: Interest or usury.
Rub al-maal: A person who invests in mudaraba.
Shari'ah: (literally, the way to the fountain) The principle from
the Koran and Sunnah to guide Muslims in the good conduct of their
lives and for the good of the community as a whole.
Sakk (pl. Sukuk): In contemporary Islamic finance, a trust
certificate of entitlement deriving from a pro-rata undivided
ownership of one or more assets. Loosely termed an "Islamic
bond."
Sunnah: The practices and sayings of the Prophet Mohammed
141. RAHAIL ALI, Glossary, in ISLAMIC FINANCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 167-69.
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(peace be upon him), as documented in Hadith.
Wakala: Agency.
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